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1. Introduction 
Venture capital is characterized with high risk and high potential revenue. Operations of venture enterprises 
include two subjects: Enterprise managers--entrepreneurs on the one hand, and capital suppliers--venture 
capitalists on the other hand. Harry S Manigart S & Vermeir W(1996)[1]made assumption about the multiple 
roles of venture capitalists and verified them. According to the study of Hellman & Puri(2000,2002)[2,3], 
venture capitalists who offered operational experiences and business relations as well as capital, played an 
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Abstract 
The development of behavioral finance has proposed an outstretched idea for traditional model, that the irrational behavior 
of venture entrepreneurs and venture capitalists has an important impact on the corporation s investment decision-making. 
This paper, based on the optimal effort model for double-sided moral hazard, has discussed the influence of the 
entrepreneurs  and venture capitalists  psychological and emotional factors on the venture enterprise value and the 
investment decision-making. And it turned out that moderate confidence of entrepreneurs and investors are able to offset the 
impact of moral hazard. Overconfidence of entrepreneurs may lead to lower corporate value, but it may also make the 
venture enterprise with a negative NPV get investment, while overconfidence of investors may cause overreaction in 
investment decision-making. E  negative and conservative psychology may result in the reduction of firm value, 
and the venture enterprise with positive net revenue may face the refusal to invest. The venture capitalists  negative and 
conservative psychology may result in under reaction in the decision-making process. The research is helpful to the decision 
making when people analyze venture capitalist  and entrepreneurs  decisions under different circumstances of emotional 
psychology. 
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important role as helpful supervisors in the operational process. Meanwhile, they have made great contributions 
to the management of capital operation, the decision-making of human resources, the establishment of 
leadership team, and the development of product market. Therefore, the joint efforts from the entrepreneurs and 
venture capitalists are influential to the success probability of venture enterprises. Furthermore, out of the 
information asymmetry and the motivation to pursue personal gain, the double-sided moral hazard eventually 
comes into being. 
Studies on the double-sided moral hazard have been done by numerous scholars. In Houben(2002) [4] s 
research, due to the failure of perfect information disclosure of the entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, hidden 
information will result in some problems, such as inadequacy of encouragement, controversy of information 
disclosure and double effort level. The analysis of Repullo & Suarez(2004)[5] s model suggests that whether, 
prior to investment, information is verifiable or not, double-sided moral hazard has great influence on the 
arrangement of optimal contract. With the verifiable information, the optimal contract is arranged into equity 
contract according to the objective performance standard; with the unverifiable information, however, the 
optimal contract is nonlinear contract. In these studies on double-sided moral hazard, entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists are assumed as perfectly rational economic men, who follow the principle of expected utility 
maximization. However, people act unconsciously in limited rationality. The rise of behavioral finance 
uncovers the laws of economy hidden by the traditional complete-rationality hypothesis. 
Since Roll (1986) [6] s establishment of the groundbreaking Hubris Hypothesis, psychology deviation about 
managers  overconfidence has been the explanation of ethnology of the corporate finance. The overconfidence 
is the deviation between people s inclination to overvaluation of success probability and underestimation of 
failure probability [7-9]  In fact, decision-making of the managers or the investors is influenced by psychological 
factors profoundly. According to Heaton (2002) [10], overconfidence may lead to manager s higher sensitivity to 
cash flow, regardless of information asymmetry and principal-agent conflicts. In Wang Xia(2008) [11] s research, 
it is found that overconfident managers tend to invest excessively. Under the framework of double-sided moral 
hazard, Wang Shengcou and Zeng Yong(2008) [12] discuss the effects of entrepreneurs  overconfidence on the 
project value of start-ups. They hold that with different level of project profitability and overconfidence, the 
influence of overconfidence on project value varies. Polk and Sapienza(2009)[13] investigate the immediate 
impacts of investors  irrationality on corporate investment. If the shareholders are short-sighted, the managers 
would pursue the maximization of the short-term share price, therefore they increase investment to raise the 
price in the highly spirit of investors, and reduce investment in their low mood. Besides, Raghunathan and 
Pham(1999) [14] study on the negative psychology and find that induced anxiety contributes to decision-  
preference to projects with low risk and low returns, but the induced sadness leads to the opposite result. In 
Leme and Kltner(2000) [15] s research, fear induces decision-makers to overestimate risks and avoid them. 
This paper, under the framework of double-sided moral hazard, discusses the impacts of entrepreneurs and 
venture capitalists  emotional and psychological factors on the venture enterprise  value estimation and its 
decision-making so as to draw a more practical conclusion. The arrangement of the paper is as follows: the 
second part in the following is to assume the model and explain the variables. The third part is to analyze the 
model: a. Deducing the optimum effort level in the hypothesis of the non-moral hazard and rational man so as 
to assess the value of venture enterprises; b. Discussing the effects of entrepreneurs  and venture capitalists  
emotional and psychological factors on the firm value estimation and its decision-making respectively. The 
forth part is the conclusions. 
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2. Assumption and Explanatory variables 
2.1 Assumption  
This paper assumes that the entrepreneur (EN), as the founder of the venture enterprise, who has an 
emerging technology with lack of funds on the early stage needs capital from the venture capitalists (VC). After 
the process of screening assessment, VC decides with staging financing. For the convenience of the 
establishment of model, the paper proposes the following hypotheses.  
1) EN and VC are no longer the completely rational, and they are classified into three groups in the aspect of 
emotional psychology: overconfidence, perfect irrationality and negative and conservative psychology.  
2) Marketing factors such as taxes, interest rates, and exchange rates are neglected. 
3) VC has the shares and investments in inconsistency ratio, regardless of claim right of preferred shares. 
Profit distribution is in accordance with the shares allotment[16-17]  
4) EN only provides patented technology and human resources management but no monetary capital 
investment.   
5) There is no other loan-based financing after EN accepts capital from VC. The initial asset of the venture 
enterprises is CA. 
6) As it is difficult to observe the effort level of EN and VC, each investment stage of effort level will be 
regarded as unchanged after the two sides input their efforts.  
7) No medial profit will be generated in the development of venture. If the venture enterprises succeed at the 
end of the investment, then high revenue HR  occurs; or else, then the low revenue LR . 
8) Success probability of the venture enterprises is only related to the effort level of the EN and VC. 
9) Risk free yield is r , and the paper takes the free yield is r  as discount rate. 
2.2 Function Construction of Effort Cost 
At the initial time, VC and EN sign the contract. In order to control the risk, VC invests by stages. At the 
initial time, VC input the start-up capital 0I . It is expected to invest tI  in the t th year, or otherwise =0tI . In 
the T years, the total investment value is SI , which accounts to q  in the initial assets CA.   
According to the assumption 3), the contract says that the shares of VC is q , and 0 1q . The primary 
duty of the EN is to manage the enterprises, offer the patented technology and product development and 
manufacturing. Suppose that the effort level of EN at the t  stage is td , (0,1)td . VC need offer 
professional support for the establishment of management team for the venture enterprises, product market 
development. Suppose that the effort level of VC at the stage of t  is te , (0,1)te . Neither effort level of VC 
or EN can be observed. After the effort input, venture enterprises may end with high income or low income. 
According to assumption (6), suppose td d te e .  
The paper supposes that Hu v c R , c is the constant, 0 1c , shows the positive correlation between 
the cost scale and returns to scale. The larger the returns to scale are, the higher the cost is.  
Therefore, the present value of the total function is: 
0 0
2 2
2 2
( , ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )
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2.3 Establishment of success possibility function of venture enterprises 
By reference to the possibility model of Yang Qing and Li Jue(2004) [18]and Casamatta C(2003) [19], the 
paper assumes that the high revenue possibility for the venture enterprises is in the form of the following 
function:  
1 2
1 2
( )1( , )
( )
r d r eP d e
r r
 
 is the Beta coefficient, shows the systematic risk.  is the adjustment coefficient, adjusting the reaction 
degree of the success possibility to the risk. The paper assumes that is the constant, 0 . If 1 , then 
the degree is overreaction; if the 1, then it is the under reaction. 1  shows the effect of exterior factors on 
the success possibility. 
Additionally, 1r  and 2r ( 1 2, (0,1)r r ) relatively reflect the contribution rate of the effort level of the EN 
and VC to the success possibility. If the venture enterprises  success relies more on the patented technology of 
the EN, then 1 2r r ; if the success is more dependent on management experiences and market help of VC, 
then 2 1r r .  
2.4 Establishment of Subjective Success Possibility Function for VC and EN 
On the basis of the objective success possibility of the venture enterprises, subjective expected success 
possibility of VC and EN introduces the emotional psychology coefficient k  to reflect the emotional and 
psychological factors of VC and EN. 
The subjective success probability of VC is: 
                                                 1 2
1 2
( )( , )
( )
VC VCk rd r eP d e
r r
                                                                  (2) 
If 1VCk , then VC is rational; if 1VCk , then VC is overconfident; if 1VCk , then VC is negatively 
conserve. If ( , ) 1VCP d e , then VCk  has its upper limit, satisfying 1 2
1 2
( )
( )VC
r rk
r d r e
 
Similarly, the subjective success probability of EN is: 
                                                1 2
1 2
( )( , )
( )
EN ENk rd r eP d e
r r
                                                                   (3) 
2.5 Establishment of Revenue Function 
The paper exemplifies the final natural statement of the venture enterprises as binomial structure: high 
revenue and low revenue [21], namely, ,H LR R . The high revenue means the enterprises finish the desired 
objective under the ideal objective market, and the products are in high demand. The low revenue is generated 
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from the losing investment or the departure from the market demand. Without loss of generality, the paper 
assumes that the low revenue LR =0, the high revenue ( )HR R CA , and revenue is the function of the assets .  
3 The Establishment and Analysis of the Model  
3.1 Firm Value Analysis in the Assumption of the Non-moral-hazard and Rational Men 
In this assumption, effort level of both sides can be measured and known, and the corporate value model is: 
                          ( , ) [ ( , ) (1 ( , ) ] (1 ) ( , )H L T SE d e P d e R P d e R r C d e I                                (4) 
                       
2 2
1 2
1 2
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T
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S
r d r e d e r cE d e R r I
r r r
                     (5) 
The total differential of ( , )E d e  with respect to d  and e  are given by: 
                                
1
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2
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                                  (6) 
According to eq(6), the optimal efforts of the two sides are:  
                                                       1
1 2( ) [(1 ) 1]
g
T
r rd
c r r r
                                                      (7) 
                                                     2
1 2( ) [(1 ) 1]
g
T
r re
c r r r
                                                         (8) 
Therefore, success possibility of firms is: 
                                                
2 2
1 2
2 2
1 2
( )( , )
( ) [(1 ) 1]Tt
r r rP d e
c r r r
                                                   (9) 
All in all, other things equal, the two sides  reaching optimal effort level is the sufficient and necessary 
condition to reach the maximum corporate value. 
3.2 Analysis of the Firm Value and Decision-Making Considering the Emotional and Psychology Factors 
In reality, VC  decision-making deviates due to emotional and psychological factors. Its expected returns are 
determined by its subjective success possibility ( , )VCP d e . VC s investment sentiment impacts investment 
decision directly. When VCk is far greater than 1, then VC becomes overconfident, and increases investment, 
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neglecting investment risk, resulting in investment excess; when 0VCk , VC is negatively conserve, and to 
avoid risk, it may reduce investment or stop it; when VCk is close to the critical value VCk , VC would decline 
to invest, which is similar to the liquidity trap of Keynes.(see figure 1) 
   
Figure 1 the relation between the total investment value and investment emotional psychology 
Suppose: 
                                                                     ( )VCS VCI I k                                                                       10) 
If 0 VC VCk k , then 0
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SI ; if VC VCk k , then ( ) 0VC
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dI k
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, the total investment value VCSI  
increases with the increase of investing psychology factors VCk ; if 1VCk , then 
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2
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k
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1VCk , then 
2
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I k
k
; if 1VC VCk k , then 
2
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k
.  
Therefore, the proportion of controlling shares changes:  
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( ) ( / ( ) )
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S VC
VC VC
S S VC S
I I kq Q k
CA I I q I k I
               11) 
The revenue function is:  
(1 ) ( )( ) (1 ) ( )H VCVC S
VC
b I kR R CA b CA I
q
                                     (12) 
b  is the constant, which has positive correlation with the systematic risk  of the venture enterprises.  
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Therefore, VC s subjective expected revenue is: 
                                               ( , ) (1 ) (e)VC VC H T VCVC VC SE q P d e R r C I                                      (13) 
Insert ( , )VP d e , ( )C e  and eq (10) to eq (13), then  
        
2
1 2
1 2
( ) [1 (1 ) ][ (1 ) ( ) ] ( )
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T
VC H TVC VC
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                                 (14) 
Similarly, EN s subjective expected revenue is: 
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Because VC pursues the maximum subjective expected revenue, and his net revenue model is: 
                   
2
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Constraint condition (a) shows that EN s effort level d  need satisfy the maximization of EN s objective 
expected revenue;  
Constraint condition (b) shows that VC  effort level satisfy maximization of VC s objective expected 
revenue;  
Constraint condition (c) shows NPV greater than zero. 
According to (a), (b),  
           
1
1 2
2
1 2
(1 ) (1 ) [1 (1 ) ] 00 ( )
(1 ) [1 (1 ) ]0 0
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VC EN
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                             (17) 
Obtains: 
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                                                    1
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Insert eq (18), eq (19) to model (16), then: 
2 2 2 2
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                (20) 
Eq (20) is VC s decision-making model, and only when VC s expected NPV greater than zero, VC would 
make the investment decision. The differential of Eq(20) with respect to ENk  is given by 
2 2
1 1
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
(1 ) (1 ) [1 ( )] (1 ) (1 ) ( )=
( ) [(1 ) 1] ( ) [(1 ) 1]
T H TVC
VC VC VC VC VC VC VC
T T
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q r q k r r R Q k r k r r b I kE
k r r c r r r c r
             (21) 
Given 
VC
EN
E S
k
2
1
2 2
1 2
(1 ) (1 )
( ) [(1 ) 1]
T
T
b r r r
r r c r
 then obtain 0 simplifying eq (21)  
                                        [1 ( )] ( )VC VC VCS Q k I k k      and   0S                                         (22) 
As 0S , it can get that EN s emotional and psychological factors are influential on VC s decision-making: 
EN s increasing overconfidence (such overconfidence may reduce corporate value), would be misunderstood as 
a bull signal that the more its expected revenue VC gains, the more willing it is to invest. As a result, firms 
whose actual value is below zero get investment due to EN s overconfidence. EN s increasing negative and 
consertive psychology would be misunderstood as a bear signal that lessens VC s expected revenue. 
Consequently, firms with book value above zero may face refusal to invest. 
Suppose 
( / ) ( )( ) [1 ( )] ( )
( / ( ) )
S S VC
VC VC VC
S VC S
I q I I kf k Q k I k
I q I k I
constant ( /S SI q I ) is 
then  
( )( )= =
( ) 1
( )
VC
VC
VC
VC
I kf k
I k
I k
 
Because 0
VC
S
k
so VC s emotional psychology is influential on its investment decision-making
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expected net profit declines. However, under the circumstances 
, resulting in under reaction. Insert the eq (18) and eq(19) to 
the eq (4), and get the firm value model considering the emotional psychology: 
2 2
1 2
2 2
1 2
[1 (1 ) / 2](1 ) (1 / 2) ] (1 )( , ) { }
( ) [(1 ) 1]
T H
VCVC EN VC EN VC VC VC VC VC
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q k q r k q k q r k r r RE d e I
c r r r
(23)
Insert the eq (10), eq(11), eq(12) into the eq (23), then  
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( )
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Because
( , ) 0EN VC
EN
E k k
k
, so  
1 1
1 1 ( )EN VC VC
k
q Q k
                                                           (25) 
Because
2
2
( , )( ) 0EN VC EN EN
EN
E k k k k
k
so EN ENk k is the maximum value of 
( , )EN VCE k k Compare the equation between eq(7),eq(18), and eq (25) We can find 
     If 1ENk then EN is in the perfect rational statement, 
1
1 2
(1 )( 1)
( ) [(1 ) 1]
gVC
EN T
q r rd k d
c r r r
shows the existence of moral hazard,  EN s effort level is 
below the optimal effort level gd under the circumstances of non-moral hazard. 
    If (0,1)ENk namely,  EN is in the statement of negative and conservative psychology, 
( (0,1)) ( 1) gEN ENd k d k d  means that EN s negative emotions lessens effort level, and strays 
more from the optimal effort level gd ; 
If 
1(1, )
1EN VC
k
q
namely EN is in the statement of light confidence  
1( 1) ( (1, ))
1
g
EN EN
VC
d k d k d
q
, means that the improvement of the effort level made by the EN s 
light confidence will offset the moral hazard s influence on effort level s shrinking, making the effort level 
close to the optimal effort level.  
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If and only if
1
1EN EN VC
k k
q
, by reference to the eq(25): it is the necessary conditions of the 
maximum firm value considering the emotional and psychological factors, which is called moderate confidence. 
EN s moderate confidence of effort level just offset the moral hazard s stimulation influence on effort level s 
shrinking, making the EN s effort level d  equal to the optimal effort level gd  without moral hazard. The 
effort level is the necessary condition for the maximum corporate value considering the emotional psychology 
factors. 
If
1
1EN VC
k
q
, namely, EN is in the statement of overconfidence, 
1( )
1
g
EN
VC
d k d
q
, even 
though EN s effort level improves due to EN s  overconfidence, increases the success possibility, cost negative 
effect due to the improvement level of EN lows firm s value instead.  
All in all, EN and VC should keep positive and moderately confident in the gaming process. 
In addition, the functionary mechanism of VCk  is similar with ENk . 
1
VC
VC
k
q
 just offsets the reduction 
from moral hazard toward effort level. By reference to eq (25), 
1
VC
VC
k
q
 is not the necessary condition of 
the maximum corporate value, because VCSI  increases along with VCk s increase, and then leads to the increase 
of VCq and
H
VCR . 
As it is almost impossible to estimate the concrete expression of VCSI  accurately, it is hard to get VC s 
optimal investing emotional psychology VCk . Because moral hazard may reduce firm s value and confident 
investment psychology can offset the influence of the moral hazard, it is not hard to guess 1VCk , and VC s 
statement of moderate confidence is the necessary condition of the maximum corporate value. The paper will 
make quantity assumption in terms of related to model and parameter, and prove the existence of VCk  and 
VCk >1. 
4 Conclusions 
In the process of venture capital investment, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs reflect their limited 
rationality, not satisfying the hypothesis of traditional rational men. The paper, therefore, under the framework 
of the double moral hazard, discusses the effects of the venture capitalists and entrepreneurs  emotional 
psychology on corporate value. The result shows that the venture capitalists  and entrepreneurs  moderate 
confidence can offset the effects of moral hazard, achieving maximum firm value. At this time, entrepreneurs  
moderate confidence just offset his moral hazard but venture capital  moderate confidence is largely unable to 
offset moral hazard completely. Entrepreneurs  overconfidence may result in the reduction of venture 
enterprises  value, leaving venture enterprises  negative net revenue get investment. Venture  
overconfidence may result in overreaction in the decision-making process, and also result in the rapid reduction 
of firm value; venture entrepreneur  negative and conservative psychology may result in the reduction of firm 
value, and the venture enterprise with positive net revenue may face the refusal to invest. The venture 
capitalists  negative and conservative psychology may result in under reaction in the decision-making process. 
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